Just war theory and the invasion of Iraq, part II
What is a “just war”? Is such a thing even conceivable in Catholic thought? As a matter of fact, the Church does assert that “as long as the danger of war remains and there is no competent and sufficiently powerful authority at the international level, governments cannot be denied the right to legitimate defense once every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted.” (Gaudium et Spes no. 79). The parallel is with the right of an individual to defend himself, his legitimate rights, and those under his care. Contrary to what some people believe, the Catholic Church does not teach a doctrine of total pacifism.
Doesn’t Jesus teach us to turn the other cheek? Yes, he does, but the Church believes that in doing so he did not mean to eliminate what is in some cases not just a legitimate right but a legitimate duty. I may be allowed to not exercise my right to self-defence, but that doesn’t mean I am allowed to neglect my duty to defend someone else. And public authorities — such as Presidents of nations — are supposed to exercise their authority not for themselves, but for others. For the U.S.A. to not have intervened would have been like telling the citizens of Iraq to just keep turning the other cheek. It would have been no better than for a rich man to tell a poor man to “go in peace, be warm and filled”. Sorry, but faith without works is dead.
Still, war is serious business, and the Catholic Church does place strict conditions for both the conduct and even declaration of war. These can be found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 2309:
The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force require rigorous consideration. The gravity of such a decision makes it subject to rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy. At one and the same time:
- the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
- all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
- there must be serious prospects of success;
- the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.
These are the traditional elements enumerated in what is called the “just war” doctrine.
The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.
There are some ways in which the war in Iraq did meet these criteria. For example, the British and American forces did not use weapons of mass destruction, they did not deliberately target civilian populations, and they pressed on quicky so that the war might come to a rapid conclusion. Rather than undertake a lengthy siege of Baghdad, for example, U.S. forces undertook a risky thrust into the city which happily provoked the collapse of organized resistance, and led to a mass outpouring of the citizens to tear down symbols of the hated regime. Whatever loss of life did occur is regrettable and an evil, but it does not appear that the “power of modern means of destruction” led to evils graver than the evil to be eliminated. I’d be interested to know how many citizens of Iraq were deliberately harmed by Sadaam’s regime over the years as compared to how many were (largely) accidentally harmed by the invasion itself.
There are other ways in which the war does not seem to have met these criteria, and this is an all-or-nothing deal. Were “all other means of putting an end” to the threat posed by Sadaam Hussein’s regime really exhausted? For example, were the U.N. weapons inspectors really given a chance? Many persons, including myself, thought not. And let us not forget that at the time many were arguing that the invasion was justified as a form of “preemptive war”. The simple fact is that there is no place for such a doctrine in just war theory, because it confuses the concepts of “aggressor” and “defender,” and because while the damage we wish to prevent may be “lasting and grave,” it is not yet certain. Only the past and present are fully determined: the future is, by definition, not yet written in stone.
All of this places us in a strange place: the U.S.A. was apparently correct to invade Iraq, and the Pope (among others) was apparently correct to condemn the action as not meeting the criteria of a just war. How do we resolve this situation? In my opinion, there is only one solution: the current Catholic theology of the possibility of a just war needs to be further developed.
That doctrines can develop is a well-established principle in Catholic theology. It is also an ancient principle, put forward by St. Vincent of Lerins in the 5th century. But he did point out that “it must truly be development of the faith, not alteration of the faith. Development means that each thing expands to be itself, while alteration means that a thing is changed from one thing into another.” (Commonitorium). In other words, development of doctrine does not mean that the substance of the doctrine changes, but that a deeper meaning is discovered of it.
One of the ways this occurs is when the context in which the original doctrine was expounded changes. The new context forces us to look at the old doctrine in a new way. This is exactly what happened with the teaching of the Church on the charging of interest. In the early life of the Church, the charging of interest on a loan was considered the sin of “usury”. Today, we charge and pay interest on a whole host of transactions without any disturbance of conscience. Why is this? Our understanding of the doctrine has changed, yes, but because our understanding of money itself has changed. The economic development of society altered money from merely being a means of exchange to being a capital asset. It just isn’t correct to identify the pre-capitalist concept of money with what we have and use today. The essence of the condemnation of monetary injustice still exists — loan-sharking is still the sin of usury — but money itself is different today, which meant that the doctrine of usury needed to develop.
How does this apply to just war theory? I submit that the original just war doctrine was developed in a context which no longer exists in quite the same way. Just like the doctrine regarding usury, the doctrine of the possibility of a just war needs to be renewed. This is not to find a fig leaf to hide behind. A just war doctrine that better expresses the same principles already enunciated by the Church will not only help leaders of nations make their decision, it will also help social activists and moral leaders make their arguments with greater credibility.
More to come in part III…..